Discussions on technology and strategy in Canberra typically lead down one of three paths. The first is military implications and applications, usually in the context of our relations with the United States. The second is around trade and economics, recognising that our economy and prosperity are heavily dependent on the ideas, products and services of others. The last is darker, involving arcane sources, secret places and foreign influence, and is focused on shutting doors and barring windows.
Along each of those paths, technology is understood as something external, ‘done’ or given to Australia by others. There’s no real sense of initiation or ownership. We’ve allowed ourselves to think of Australia essentially as a spectator rather than a participant in technological innovation.
While myopic, that approach was relatively harmless when technological development was strategically neutral. But it is no longer so.
Digital technologies, in particular, are a key arena of an accelerating great-power competition. That’s important, because digital technologies are deeply intertwined with our economies, our communities, our daily lives and even our identities. Our choice and use of these technologies will increasingly shape our social interactions and constrain our political decisions.
Takers are characterized by technological weakness, with little industry and few platforms on which to build their own technological sphere—and low levels of interest in doing so. And, because of the increasing integration of technology, society and economy, they tend to assume the world view and governance habits of others.
Australia has only a fragile technology ecosystem of its own, and government is evincing little interest in supporting it to the extent needed for it to establish its own critical mass. Indeed, the overall trend for research and development expenditure is towards stasis, if not decline.
It’s interesting to consider Australia’s decision to exclude Huawei from the nation’s 5G network through that lens. Like the Assistance and Access Bill, it reflects the growing influence of internal security concerns among the Five Eyes partners. Yet neither decision motivated the Australian government to invest significantly in a technology industry or public sector capability to develop alternatives and provide greater autonomy over future options.
In short, Australia is a technology taker.
Well, old habits are hard to break. Following the American model—a focus on the technological, leaving people to sort out the consequences of new products and services—follows old, well-worn paths in national security, business and society.
However, Silicon Valley has come under sustained criticism from a wide section of the Australian community and government, on issues ranging from taxation to social media to national security. US defence technology is increasingly expensive and burdensome. We’ve accepted that in the past as a part of being an ally and a technology taker, but doing so may become more precarious, especially with volatility generated by President Donald Trump in the relationship.
But Western Europeans are increasingly concerned with internal stability and coherence. Europe’s demographics and economies fall short of the social, economic and technical dynamism present in our own larger neighbourhood. Australia cannot rely on it shaping the future of the intersection of technology and society in our favour.
The Chinese model—aggressive use of technology for authoritarian purposes—is characterised by surveillance, behaviour modification, a denial of privacy or secrets for anyone other than the state, and the subservience of all industry, research, institutions, communities, people and data to the Chinese Communist Party.
Needless to say, that is fundamentally antithetical to Western concepts of democracy. And yet, it’s notable that those who are free with their criticism of American platforms, including Western governments, are hesitant to criticise the increasingly large and powerful—and CCP-supported—Chinese platforms.
Western companies have benefited from Chinese state control, for example, through ‘programmable labour’, the development of technologies facilitating surveillance or simply access to its market. And China offers a number of self-interested parties, whether governments, police forces or companies in competitive markets, a range of incentives, such as Belt and Road Initiative loans, state-subsidised technology and the means of monitoring and controlling citizenry.
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